In accordance with Articles IX.3 and IX.4 of the World Trade Organization Agreement, the worldwide epidemic of Covid-19, the largest health tragedy to hit the world in the previous century, has unquestionably been a “exceptional situation,” killing millions of people and causing unparalleled economic and social suffering around the world. As the epidemic spreads, nations will need to come up with creative solutions to not only boost vaccine manufacturing, but also guarantee that vaccines are distributed on time and at a reasonable cost. The TRIPS Agreement’s obligation to satisfy strict IP requirements may not be an option in this scenario. International agreement TRIPS is part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and aims to create a common level of intellectual property protection for all members (WTO). When TRIPS was signed into law in 2001, the Uruguay Round of global trade negotiations came to an end. Before finally caving in to intense pressure from wealthy country governments, poor country leaders resisted the completion of the accord on philosophical and economic grounds. Despite their protests, practically all governments in poor countries have enacted TRIPS-compliant policies, many of which are stricter than required under TRIPs. To explain the puzzle, this article aims to test if the many theories of international rule compliance, including realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism, are all correct. A closer look at domestic politics in developing nations is needed in order to assess their propensity to cooperate, since none of these hypotheses can explain the observed variance.
Key words: WTO, Compulsory Licensing, patent, Developing Countries, COVID-19
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